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Uan Dcmer's Briaade at €bickamauda 

BY GEN. J. W. BISHOP 

THEN LieUT. COL. SECOND REGIMENT MINN. INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS 



PAPER Read before Minnesota Commandery 
OF Loyal Legion u. S., May 12, 1903 



WITH COMPLIMENTS^OF THE WRITER 




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VAN DERVEER'S BRIGADE AT CHICKAMAUGA 

By general J. W. BISHOP, 
(Then Lieut. Col. Second Regiment Minnesota Infantry Volunteers.) 



Paper Read before Minnesota Commandery 
OF Loyal Legion V. S., May 12, 1903. 



During the period covered by this narrative, the follow- 
ing infantry regiments, viz., the 9th Ohio, (Col. Gustave 
Kammeriing), the 35th Ohio, (Lt. Col. H. V. Boynton). 
the 87th Indiana, (Col. Newell Gleason), and the 2nd Min- 
nesota, (Col. James George), and Battery "I," 4th U. 
S. Artillery, commanded by Lt. Frank G. Smith, constituted 
(the Third Brigade of Third Division, 14th Army Corps, 
Army of the Cumberland. 

The Army was commanded by Major General W. S. 
Rosecrans, the Corps by Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, the 
Division by Brig. Gen. J. M. Brannan, and the Brigade 
by Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer, of the 35th Ohio, and 
was called and known as "Van Derveer's Brigade." 

On the 1 6th day of August, 1863, the Army of the 
Cumberland, at and near Tullahoma, Tennessee, commenced 
the campaign for the capture and possession of Chattanooga, 
involving the expulsion therefrom, and the defeat in battle, 
if possible, of the Confederate Army under Gen. Bragg, 
then occupying that city and the country about it. 

We cannot even briefly describe in this paper, the mas- 
terly strategy of the ensuing thirty days, by which our 






army was taken over the Cumberland , Range, across the 
Tennessee River, over the Sand Moimtain Range into the 
Lookout Valley, and then over the Lookout Mountain 
Range, in eager pursuit of our old enemy. 

On the 8th of September, finding us pervading the coun- 
try and threatening his communications South of Chatta- 
nooga, he had evacuated that place, and, with his whole 
army, retired some thirty or forty miles Southward, to- 
wards Rome. 

A few days later, as our army descended the Eastern slope 
of the Lookout Range, by the several narrow and difficult 
passes, from twenty-five to forty miles South of Chatta- 
nooga, we found the situation had suddenly and com- 
pletely changed. Bragg, being reinforced by Longstreet's 
Corps from Virginia, by Buckner's from East Tennessee, 

and by a detachment from Johnston's Army in Mississippi, 
was concentrated at and near Lafayette, and with largely 
superior numbers was now intent upon attacking us as we 
emerged in detachments from the mountain passes. Twice 
he attempted such attacks, only to have his plans fail, as he 
claimed, for want of co-operation by his corps comman- 
ders. 

Rosecrans, appreciating the new situation, by energetic 
maneuvering, was withdrawing his army fronn pursuit and 
cO'llecting it for battle; and so we found, on the i8th of 
September, both Armies concentrated and confronting each 
other in the Chickamauga Valley, at and extending South- 
ward from the vicinity of Lee & Gordon's Mill ; the Chicka- 
mauga Creek flowing Northward between them, in a tor- 
tuous course, and with a deep and silent channel down the 
center of the valley. 

At this mill, the Lafayette-Chattanooga Road crosses 
from the east to the west side of the creek, and then runs 
northerly parallel with it about five miles, to the Cloud 



Church, so-called, thence northwesterly about three miles 
to and through the Rossville Gap in Mission Ridge, to the 
Chattanooga Valley, and thence northerly about four miles 
to Chattanooga. This road, for the first five miles north- 
ward from Lee & Gordon's mill, was, so to speak, the axis 
of the coming battle, and its possession was the immediate 
object oi the contest. It lay about midway between the 
Chickamauga Creek to the eastward, and Mission Ridge 
to the westward, at an average distance of about two miles 
from each; so the battle field may be said to be contained 
in the rectangle five miles north and south by four miles 
east and west, though not all that ground was actually 
fought over. 

As we faced northward toward Chattanooga, the Mission 
Ridge on our left afforded twO' practicable passes to the 
Chattanooga Valley lying west of it, the one known as 
"McFarland's Gap," or the "Dry Valley Road," seven miles 
south of Chattanooga, and the other and better one, through 
which led the main Lafayette-Chattanooga Road, was the 
"Rossville Gap" already mentioned. The battle field was 
mostly covered with timber, much of it with a dense growth 
of underbrush, though there were several farms with open 
fields and log buildings, with narrow local roads or trails, 
(not shown on the map) leading in various directions from 
one farm; to another, and to the several fords and bridges 
crossing the creek about half a mile apart. Nowhere was 
any extended or comprehensive view of the field possible, 
even by daylight ; and as both armies came ontoi the field dur- 
ing the night time, neither could have any definite knowledge 
or understanding next morning, of the presence or posi- 
tion of the other, until they actually came into collision from 
time to time. 

On the 17th Van Derveer's Brigade had bivouacked — 
"(encamping had long been obsolete with us as a word or 



a practice) — near the west bank of the creek, some six or 
seven miles above (south of) Lee & Gordon's; — a brigade 
of the enemy iwas in the woods just across the creek, and, 
as has been said, the two armies were looking, as it were, 
defiantly into each other's faces. All that night and the 
next day they were moving by brigades and divisions, clos- 
ing up from the south and stretching out to the north, we 
moving by the left flank and the enemy by the right. 

Bragg had given up his plan of attacking Rosecrans in 
the upper valley, and on the i8th ordered a general move- 
ment, the scheme of which was, to extend his right beyond 
our left, cross the creek during the night, at the various 
fords and bridges, place his army across the Chattanooga 
road ahead of us, and on the morning of the 19th to attack 
the Union Army on its left, double it up and drive it back 
up the valley. This plan was so far worked out as to place 
his whole army (except three divisions) in the woods on our 
side of the creek, before sunrise of the 19th. 

Meantime Rosecrans had also moved to his left, on the 
Crawfish Springs and parallel roads, and at sunrise that 
morning was again facing the enemy, with a line of battle 
hastily and irregularly formed in the darkness and in the 
woods, but between the enemy and the main Lafayette- 
Chattanooga road. 

Returning to Van Derveer's Brigade in bivouac away up 
the valley. There we spent the day, (the i8th) Hstening to 
the racket of moving artillery and trains, and watching the 
long clouds of dust before and behind us, until, at four 
o'clock, we were called to take our place in the procession. 
The roads were choked with troops, with artillery and 
wagons, alternately moving and standing, never halting 
long enough to stack arms and rest, and never moving more 
than a few rods at a time. We spent the next fifteen hours 
in marching probably some seven or eight miles, in the 



blinding, suffocating dust, unable during the niglit to see, 
and too tired and exasperated to guess what was going on. 
At daybreak we passed General Rosecrans' Headquarters 
at the Widow Glenn's Log House on the battle field, and we 
now began to observe the regiments and batteries ahead of 
us, moving off into the woods to the right of the road, and 
presently we seemed to have got through the army to and 
beyond its left flank, and had a clear road ahead of us as 
far ?iS we could see. We could now understand what a slow 
and tedious process had been the formation of the army into 
line of battle during the night, and that others, perhaps even 
the enemy, were as weary and hungry as we were. 

An open field lay to the left of the road, and our brigade 
was marched into^ it, and arms were stacked on information 
that we were to have "twenty minutes for breakfast." We 
need not in this presence describe the eager haste with 
which the little fires were lighted, and the coffee and bacon 
and hard-tack were made ready; but before we had tasted 
a morsel an order came to take arms and march immedi- 
ately. Some desperate emergency was of course to be pre- 
sumed, but to meet it with empty bellies at that moment, 
was a severe trial of our patriotism. We had no time, how- 
ever, to argue or to think about it. Arms were taken and we 
filed out into the dusty road again and started northward, 
every man carrying as best he could his little can of boiling 
coffee, nibbling at his hardtack, and relieving his indignant 
soul, at every step, of thoughts not to be quoted here, but 
at the time better uttered perhaps than suppressed. 

One of these men said to me some thirty years after- 
wards : "Colonel, d'ye mind that breakfast we didn't ate at 
Chickamauga? — be Jazis Oi can taste it yet." 



BATTLE OF JAY's MILL. 

Meantime in explanation of the situation, and of our 
orders, I quote from Gen. Rosecrans' Report — (Vol. 50, 
p. 56, Official Records). Speaking of the morning of the 
19th he says: "At this point Colonel McCook of Gen. 
Granger's Command, who had made a reconnaisance to the 
Chickamauga the evening before, and had burned Reed's 
Bridge, met General Thomas and reported that an isolated 
brigade of the enemy was on this side of the Chickamauga, 
and the bridge being destroyed, a rapid movement in that 
direction might result in the capture of the force thus iso- 
laited." So we were expected to find that lonesome brigade 
and bring it in before breakfast. 

Marching down the main Chattanooga Road we soon 
passed beyond the left of our general line of battle, (then 
forming in the woods to the east of and out of sight from 
the road,) and arriving at McDonald's house we turned 
squarely to the east on the cross road leading to- Reed's 
Bridge about two miles distant. Jay's Mill, near where 
the coming engagement took place, is about forty rods south 
of this road and 160 rods west of Reed's Bridge. Our way 
lay along a ridge of low elevation, with easy slopes to either 
side; the land, so far as we could see, being covered with 
trees mostly oi small size, and without underbrush, giving 
an open view of perhaps forty rods or more in every direc- 
tion. As we advanced the brigade was deployed — the 
2nd Minnesota to the left of the road, the 35th Ohio to the 
right, with the battery in the road between the regiments, 
and a line of skirmishers in advance. The 87th Indiana 
was placed behind the 35th Ohio, the 9th Ohio being absent 
in charge of our Division wagon train. 

We had thus proceeded about a mile and a half toward 
the creek, when a spluttering skirmish fire broke out away 
to our right and front, and changing direction to face it 

6 



the regiments moved off the road to the right ahout a hund- 
red yards, where we halted as the enemy came in view, and 
the battle was promptly opened by both opposing lines — ^oiir 
battery remaining in the road and firing over our heads 
and through the interval between our regiments. 

In a few minutes the enemy's fire began to weaken, and 
presently their line broke and went to the rear out of our 
sight They soon came back with a fresh attack more ener- 
getic and persistent than the first, intending apparently to 
sweep us out of the way, without spending much more valu- 
able time on the job. As we read the reports now, we 
know how impatient the Confederate Commanders must 
have been to find their supposed open way around Rosecrans' 
left, thus obstructed so early in the day ; but this second at- 
tack was also promptly repulsed, and the enemy, (Ector's 
Brigade of Walker's Division) soon disappeared. 

Now the 87th Indiana replaced the 35th Ohio on our 
right, and our bandmen commenced to gather up our 
wounded men, carrying them back across the road to the 
northern slope, where the surgeons gave them such atten- 
tion as the time and place permitted — and the 2nd Regiment 
was moved a little to the left to give the battery a wider 
interval. 

Then the firing broke out again in the same direction; 
first the scattering fire of skirmishers — then the terrific file 
firing of regiments, then the artillery, then the "rebel yell," 
and the firing gradually approached us. We stood attentive 
and expectant for a few minutes, then a straggling line of 
men in blue appeared coming toward us in wild retreat, 
their speed accelerated by the firing and yelling of the exult- 
ant Confederates who were close behind them. I do not 
remember any more appalling spectacle than this was for 
a few minutes ; but our men took it with grim composure, 
lying down until the stampeded brigade had passed over our 

7 



line, then rising and blazing a volley into the enemy's faces, 
which abruptly ended the yelling and the charge. They 
had not expected such a reception, and all efforts of their 
officers to get or hold their men in line for a fight, were in 
vain. They promptly retreated in their turn until out of 
range and out of sight. This was Walthall's Confederate 
Brigade of Liddell's Division. They had successfully as- 
saulted the left brigade of Baird's Division on Rosecrans' 
left, breaking and driving it out of line and capturing its 
guns, — Guenther's Battery "H." U. S. 4th Artillery. 

Now came up the 9th Ohio. They had he?-rd the firing. 
and following Van Derveer's trail arrived just as the last 
fight was finished, as above described. This was a German 
regiment, using only German language and German tactics, 
and was originally commanded by Coh Bob McCook. 
They had been in the Mill Springs battle, in line with the 
2nd Minnesota, and they were furious now to find that, as 
they supposed, the fighting was all over before their arrival. 
Col. Kammerling soon learned what direction the retiring 
enemy had taken, and shouting in German to his men they 
passed our lines to the front and disappeared among the 
trees. Van Derveer sent an aid after them, with peremp- 
tory orders to return, but before his arrival they had re- 
captured Guenther's Battery after a sharp fight in vhich 
they lost a good many men, and were then obliged to leave 
it for want of horses to bring it away. 

Meantime it soon became apparent that the enemy had 
not given up their scheme of enveloping Rosecrans' left. 
We could presently see Confederate troops moving north- 
ward across the road to our left, and an attack was made on 
us from; that direction. The 2nd Minnesota anticipated 
and met it alone by facing left and filing left, and so form- 
ing across the road north and south, facing east, thus plac- 
ing its right where its left had been. This attack was easily 

8 



repulsed — it was probably intended only to cover the move- 
ment oif troops around us, yet more to the left. 

As this movement became apparent the 2nd Minnesota 
again changed position by facing left and filing left, thus 
getting into line just north of and parallel to the road with 
its left next the battery, which had, without leaving its 
first position, "about faced" so to speak, so as to fire in the 
opposite direction or northward. The other regiments of 
our brigade took places to the left of the battery, and a 
part of Connell's Brigade of Brannan's Division arrived 
and were placed to extend our line, still farther to the left 
or westward. 

In this position our regiment found our wounded men 
on the ground in front of us, but there was no time to make 
any changes. The enemy were approaching in orderly array 
— ranks behind ranks — no skirmishers or preliminary fir- 
ing, but with the evident intention of forcing an actual col- 
lision, in which they should have a large majority. We 
opened on them at about 200 yards, with carefully directed 
file firing, while the battery treated them with canister in 
double doses. They made no reply, but with splendid cour- 
age continued their steady advance. Their ranks were soon 
so depleted, however, as to- make it plain that they could not 
make a successful rush — at fifty yards they began to "wab- 
ble" and commenced firing wildly, and presently they started 
back in wild disorder, retiring out of sight. Thus ended 
the fighting of Van Derveer's Brigade for the day, of which 
Gen, Ro'Secrans says : "This vigorous movement discon- 
certed the plans of the enemy on our left and opened the 
battle of the 19th September/' Vol. 50, O. R. P. 56. 

During the day thereafter divisions and brigades came 
into collision as they found each other out, and plans had 
to be improvised and lines readjusted from hour to hour. 
We heard the roar of the battle as it extended southward. 



involving most of the divisions in both armies, but in our 
vicinity no further attack was made. 

The troops whose attack was last repulsed as above, were, 
as we now know, Davidson's and Dibrell's Brigades of 
Forest's Division of Cavalry dismounted, comprising nine 
regiments and five battalions or squardons. The 2nd Min- 
nesota commenced the day with 384 officers and men, and 
lost here, 8 men killed and 41 wounded. The brigade, out 
of 1,788 men lost 42 killed and 236 wounded — total 278, 
or 15^ per cent of the force engaged. 

After collecting and caring for our dead and wounded, 
and replenishing our cartridge boxes, our brigade was 
ordered to a position in reserve, and at sunset was bivou- 
acked for the night, without fires. Of course we knew that 
the battle was to be renewed next morning, and that before 
it was over many more of us would doubtless join our dead 
and wounded comrades who lay in thousands all over the 
field that cold September night. Yet, with sorrow for the 
dead, and pity for the wounded, and with thoughts of loved 
ones at home, we sought rest as best we could on the hard, 
gravelly hillside under the sentinel stars. 



BATTLE OF KELLY S FIELD. 

On Sunday morning, September 20th, the sun rose clear 
and soon dissipated the hazy mist that had settled over the 
field during the night. 

Bragg's Army was now all in the woods on the west 
side of the creek, extending in irregular line from the 
Reed's Bridge Road near Jay's Mill, southwestwardly about 
three miles to a point southeast of the Viniard house. 

Rosecrans' army was in line east of and nearly parallel 
to the main Chattanooga Road, and between it and the 



enemy, except that his right had been swung back and 
rested between the Viniard house and Widow Glenn's. 

The official records now show that Bragg had given 
to General Polk the command of the Confederate right wing, 
and to General Longstreet that of the left wing, with posi- 
tive orders to Polk to commence a vigorous attack at day- 
break, by his right division, to be promptly taken up by all 
the Confederate Divisions from right to left. Also, that 
when Bragg, at his headquarters, had waited with furious 
impatience until 8 130 for the attack to begin, he sent an aid, 
who found Polk at a comfortable farm house, eating a 
leisurely breakfast; and, it is said, that on learning this, 
Bragg dispatched his whole staff up and down the line, 
with orders to every captain to put his men into the fight at 
once. So it was that up tO' so late an hour the solemn 
quiet of that Sabbath morning was unbroken. 

Van Derveer, at 8 o'clock, was placed in reserve in an 
open field, on west side of the road, about 80 rods south of 
the Kelly House and in rear of our general line of battle, 
which, being in the woods, was invisible to us. The Con- 
federate attack was commenced on our left about 9 130 
o'clock, and, in a few minutes, had extended to involve 
nearly all of both armies. To us, idle in the open field, the 
roar of musketry and artillery was appalling. The enemy's 
bullets and shells came through the trees to and among us 
in a very disquieting manner, and presently a horde of strag- 
glers in blue, came back out of the w^oods, and passed on 
tO' the rear, singly at first, then in squads, until it seemed 
that our line in front must be breaking up, and we were 
expecting to be ordered in to replace or support it, when an 
order came for us to go immediately to Kelly's Field. 

Bragg had renewed his scheme for enveloping our left, 
and while the battle was raging along the line of both arm- 
ies, with terrific slaughter and varying success, Breckin- 



ridge's Division, which overlapped our left, was ordered to 
swing around it to the south and attack our flank in the 
rear. He had three brigades in line from left to right, 
Helm's, Stovall's and Adams'. Helm's Brigade struck the 
left brigade of Baird's Division, and was wrecked right there 
and then — Helm and two of his colonels being killed. But 
Stovall and Adams found no opposition, being beyond our 
left, and soon reached the main road near McDonald's, 
where they turned south and were coming gayly on — Stovall 
on the east of the road, Adams on the west, and a battery 
trailing down the road between and behind them. 

Of all this we were ignorant, Breckinridge's operations be- 
ing screened from our view by the woods about and north 
of Kelly's Field; so our brigade moved by the left flank 
northward until opposite Kelly's Field, and then facing 
eastward, marched through a strip of thick woods and 
undefbrush to the main road, and crossing it, intO' the field. 
Here we stood for a moment, the brigade in two lines in 
rear of and facing east towards, our main line of battle, 
which, in the woods, was not to be seen from our position. 
The 2nd Minnesota was on the right in the front line — the 
87th Indiana on its left — the 9th Ohioi a few paces in rear of 
the 2nd Minnesota, and the 35th Ohio in rear of the 87th 
Indiana. (Smith's Battery had been taken away from us 
in the morning.) 

Along the north end of the field, and perhaps 50 yards 
from the left of our left regiments was a thick woods with 
underbrush, into which nothing could be seen from our 
position. We had hardly halted, when, with a crash of 
musketry and a cloud of gray smoke from the edge of the 
woods on our left, the air was filled with bullets, and our 
men began to fall. A change of front to face this attack was 
instantly commenced, and was executed on the run; but 
before it brought us face to face with our enemy a good 



12 



many of our men, and nearly all of the horses in the brigade, 
were killed or wounded. 

As our men came into line the 2nd Minnesota and 87th 
Indiana rushed down to the edge of the woods, and for a few 
minutes the opposing lines fired into each others faces, at less 
than thirty yards distance. But we were at a disadvantage, 
standing in the open field, while the enemy were protected in 
the 'woods, and moreover, the two regiments behind us were 
fully exposed to the enemy's fire, and unable to return it — 
so the second line, (with guns all loaded,) was ordered to 
pass the first, and then both lines joined in the charge into 
the woods. The enemy promptly gave up their position 
at the edge of the field and retired back among the trees and 
brush, where, for a time, they stubbornly resisted our furth- 
er advance; but after a hot contest of perhaps fifteen or 
twenty minutes, they withdrew altogether. 

It will appear from what has been said, that Stovall's 
Confederate brigade was in this affair opposed to ours. 
Adams, (on Stovall's right,) was opposed by other Union 
troops which we could not see during the action, and only 
know from the reports to have been parts of Stanley's, Beat- 
ty's and Willich's Brigades. Adams, the Confederate brigade 
commander, was badly wotmded, and was captured (ac- 
cording to the official records) by at least seven different 
regiments. Stovall describes this collision as follcw's : 
(Vol. 51, p. 231, O. R.) Here (near McDonald's) the brig- 
ade was halted, and by a flank movement formed nearly 
perpendicular to its former position. Thus re-formed, I 
moved forward, and had not gone far before I encountered 
the enemy in heavy forces and strongly entrenched. Here 
the battle raged fiercely; a concentrated fire of grape and 
canister, shot and shell of every conceivable character, was 
poured into us from the front, while my left suffered no 
less from an enfilading fire, equally galling and severe." 

13 



Now we comirienced collecting our dead for burial, and 
bringing our wounded back to vicinity of Kelly's house, 
where the surgeons could care for them. About 2 o'clock, 
and before this duty was completed, the battle away to our 
right seemed to open again with increased fury, and to be 
trending around to our rear; and presently orders came to 
go to Gen. Thomas, who was then collecting all available 
troops at 

SNODGRASS RIDGE, 

We arrived there about 2 130, and were placed in a single 
line, the 35th Ohio on the right, then the 2nd Minnesota, 
the 87th Indiana and the 9th Ohio. On our left were parts 
of Stanley's, Croxton's and Connell's Brigades, and Smith's 
Battery, all, as we were, under comoiand of Gen. Brannan ; 
also, on his left were parts of Hazen's & Marker's Brigades ; 
on our right there were then no Union troops. 

Snodgrass Ridge was a spur extending out from Mission 
Ridge to the eastward, about 80 or 90 feet higher than the 
plain into which it descended, and terminated about 80 
rods west of the Lafayette Road. The Snodgrass log 
buildings were located on the northern slope and about 30 
or 40 yards back from the crest. The ridge was covered, 
(except the Snodgrass field east and north of the buildings,) 
with timber, and on the southern slope was a growth of 
underbrush, when the battle here commenced. This was 
mostly shot away before 4 o'clock, so that we had thereafter 
had a clear view down the easy slope up which the advances 
of the enemy were made. 

In view of serious misfortunes which had befallen several 
divisions of our right wing, compelling them to vacate that 
part of the field south of Snodgrass, the possession of this 
ridge had become of the greatest importance to each army. 

Longstreet, commanding the Confederate left wing, had 
swung his lines around to the west and north and now they 



lay south of and parallel to the ridge. He says in his official 
report, (Vol. 51, p. 289) — "It was evident that with this 
position gained I should be master of the field;" and with 
soldierly appreciation of the situation he prepared to take 
it, probably not anticipating much resistance. But Gen. 
Thomas was there before him, and with more than equal 
energy and determination was gathering and posting for 
its defense, all the troops, organized, and fragmentary, that 
could be found, not engaged elsewhere. The Union Army 
Commander, two of the three Corps Co'mmanders, four 
of the ten Division Commanders, and broken brigades, regi- 
ments, stragglers and skulkers unnumbered, with artillery, 
ammunition wagons and ambulances, had drifted or been 
swept from the field, passing through McFarland's Gap, and 
behind Mission Ridge, were making their way tO' Rossville. 
An orderly withdrawal for Thomas, and that part of the 
army that remained with him, was now only possible by 
keeping Longstreet and his army south of Snodgrass Ridge 
until night. As our 2nd Minnesota Regiment moved up 
to the crest of the ridge we found there the 21st Ohio, a 
fine, large regiment, armed with six chambered revolving 
rifles. Upon our appearance they immediately asked tO' be 
relieved, claiming to be out of ammunition. We had been 
unable to replenish at or after Kelley's Field, and had only 
fifteen or twenty rounds in our cartridge boxes, but we took 
their place, and they retired down the slope to the rear. 
An hour later we heard that they had got ammunition from 
Granger, and, with the 89th Ohio and the 22nd Michigan, 
attached temporarily to Whitaker, had taken places on the 
right of our brigade. 

Longstreet had vainly assaulted the ridge before our 
arrival, and within thirty minutes thereafter he made two 
more unsuccessful attacks with the troops he had nearest 
at hand. Meantime, Gen. Granger had arrived with two 

15 



fresh Union brigades under Whitaker and Mitchell, Gen. 
J. B, Steedman commanding the division. 

They had come from McAfee's church 2 m.iles east from 
Rossville, and for a mile or more had marched through a 
cloud of Confederate skirmishers, straight to the sound of 
our guns. Granger had orders to aid Thomas, and seemed 
to know where and how to find him. Never were reinforce- 
ments more welcome. Thomas immediately ordered them 
to the crest of the ridge on our right, which the enemy had 
found to be vacant, and had in fact just occupied ; so that, 
Steedman's brigades had to assault and drive the enemy off, 
thus accomplishing with desperate fighting and heavy loss, 
just what the enemy had attempted and failed to do in our 
immediate front. 

The firing was terrific while this was being done, and we 
were much relieved when we heard that Steedman had 
gained the ridge. He had brought some ammunition with 
his column, and we got a few rounds of which we were in 
desperate need, from his wagons. 

In the intervals between the enemy's assaults, we had 
robbed the boxes of the dead and wounded — Union and 
Confederate alike — and had carefully avoided waste, but we 
were nearly destitute when Granger's wagons arrived. 

It had become plain to both commanders that here was to 
be the supreme contest for the field, and Longstreet now 
marshalled the Veteran Divisions of Kershaw, Hindman and 
Johnson, and sent them in to take the ridge. Each of their 
successive and repeated assaults were repulsed with heavy 
loss; finally, at 4:30, Preston's Division, which had not 
been previously engaged at all on either day, was lined up 
at the foot of the southern slope, and with courage and 
enthusiasm, stimtil^-ted to the utmost, advanced to their fate 
— Grade's brigade in front of Van Derveer's and Trigg and 
Kelly against the troops on our right. 

16 



The slope in our front was now well cleared of under- 
brush, and we could see the gray legs of the front line, as, 
in regular step, they crossed the road at the foot and com- 
menced the ascent, a second line following, each containing 
more men than were in the thin, single line of defenders. 
"Don't waste any cartidges now, boys," was the only in- 
struction given, (and this was quite unnecessary) as our line 
commenced firing — and the men in gray commenced fall- 
ing ; but they seemed to bow their heads to the storm of bul- 
lets, and picking their way among and over their fallen 
comrades who already encumbered the slope by hundreds, 
they came bravely and steadily on; as however they ap- 
proached nearer, and the firing in their faces grew hotter 
and more deadly, they seemed to lose the assuring touch 
of elbows, and as the vacancies rapidly increased, they be- 
gan to hesitate— "Now we've got 'em, see 'em wabble" were 
the first words that passed in our lines since the firing had 
begun — then they halted and commenced firing wildly into 
the tree tops, then turned and rushed madly down the slope, 
carrying the second line with them. 

(This was substantially the story of the preceding as- 
saults which, at intervals of twenty or thirty minutes, had 
been met and repulsed during the past two hours. Each 
assaulting brigade had made two, and some of them three, 
such attempts.) 

Grade's brigade was promptly re-formed and advanced 
again, this time getting so near to us that some of their men 
came in and surrendered rather than to be shot in the back, 
as were many of those trying to run. A third attack was 
made by this brigade as soon as it could be re-formed, only 
to result in further sacrifice of its men and a third and final 
repulse. 

It was now sundown, and we felt that the contest was 
over; but our satisfaction was tempered by the reflection 

17 



that "they may come again," and we had now in our regi- 
ment, less than lOO cartridges for 250 guns. Meantime 
Trigg and Kelly had been more successful. Steedman's 
troops had been withdrawn, leaving the three orphan regi- 
ments only on our right. These had exhausted their am- 
munition, but had been ordered tO' fix bayonets and hold 
their lines. 

Trigg and Kelly, finding Steedman's lines vacant, and 
getting no more bullets from the detached regiments, soon 
enveloped them with loaded guns against fixed bayonets, 
and called on them to surrender or be shot down where they 
stood; and they surrendered and were started for Ander- 
sonville — a most pitiful ending of two days of gallant ser- 
vice in battle. 

Being engaged with Gracie in our front, we were ignorant 
of all this for a time, but when, elated with their success, 
the enemy next came sneaking around the right of our bri- 
gade, they were discovered by Lt. Col. Boynton of the 35th 
Ohio, who promptly swung his regiment back and con- 
fronted them, and fired the last volley of the day, and the 
last cartridges he had, into their faces. It was now getting 
dark among the trees, and uncertain O'f the situation, the 
enemy withdrew and the battle of Chickamauga was over. 

Meantime, about 5 o'clock, Thomas had ordered the with- 
drawal by divisions, of all his troops except those who' were 
holding the ridge to cover the movement. Reynolds, Pal- 
mer, Johnson and Baird were holding their lines in that 
part of the field north of Snodgrass, in a semi-circle north, 
east and south of the Kelly House, the enemy closely watch- 
ing their front — ^both sides much depleted in numbers, and 
well nigh exhausted by the two days fighting. 

Longstreet, (Vol. 51, p. 289,) says: "At 3 o'clock in 
the afternoon. I asked the Commanding General for some of 
the troops of the right wing, but was informed by him that 

18 



they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no 
service to me." When the movement began, the enemy, in 
a weary fashion, attacked each division in turn, but the with- 
drawal was accomplished without serious hindrance or dis- 
order about 6 130 o'clock. Probably Polk was more than 
willing- that Thomas should withdraw at that time if he 
wanted to. and, not to be outdone in courtesy, Thomas wait- 
ed an hour later for Longstreet to retire first. 

When all was over some of us walked down the slope in 
our front, in the darkening twilight — the dry leaves and 
twigs had taken fire and little serpents of flame were creep- 
ing around and among the Confederate dead and wounded, 
who now thickly covered the ground. We carried back 
our own wounded men and left them near the Snodgrass 
buildings — nothing more could be done for them; and at 
7 130 the field having been quiet for an hour or more, the men 
with Brannan on the ridge, filed down the Northern slope, 
and, unmolested, took the road to and through McFarland's 
Gap to Rossville, all on our left having previously gone ; Van 
Derveer's Brigade being the last to leave the field, followed 
only by the 68th and loist Indiana as rear guard, which 
as Brannan explained, "were the only regiments that had 
any ammunition whatever." (Vol. 50, O. R. P. 393.) 

Some of the wounded were able, with more or less aid, to 
accompany the troops in the retirement, but more than 
twenty thousand of them, and four thousand dead and dying, 
were left on the field, abandoned for the night by both 
armies. So cruel is War. 

On the Ridge, as the day wore on from 2 130 to 6 :30. the 
situation had at times seemed absolutely desperate. We had 
no relief or reserve whatever, every man being in the single 
firing line, which, excluding Steedman's troops, could not 
have extended more than 160 rods, with our right flank 
wholly vacant, and on our left an interval of perhaps 80 



rods, protected only by the six guns of Smith's Battery, 
Willich's Brigade being beyond the interval. 

Brannan says (Vol. 50^ P. 403, O. R.) that "his entire 
force during the day and afternoon on this ridge could not 
have been over 2,500 men, including the stragglers of vari- 
ous regiments and divisions, besides my own immediate 
command." Longstreet's four divisions which assaulted the 
Ridge after 3 o'clock, lost, in killed and wounded, 5,589 
men, most of them in front of the Ridge, and that is more 
than one-third of the total Confederate loss (15,801 — K. 
& W.) in the two days' fighting, and more than three times 
the total loss of the United States army in the Spanish- 
American War of 1898 (K. 280 W. 1577 — 1857). In our 
front it seemed as if the whole Confederate army were 
against us, and every available brigade was there in fact. 
But our chief worry was the ammunition question.. We 
knew that Thomas' trains had been piloted ofif the field to 
Rossville, and but for Granger's arrival we would have been 
absolutely destitute by 4 o'clock. To "fix bayonets (without 
cartridges) and hold the line" against loaded guns in the 
hands of twice as many equally brave men. is an order 
which should not be given unless it has become necessary 
to sacrifice the men to whom it is given. 

The royal presence of General Thomas there was an in- 
spiration to us all, who knew and loved and trusted him, and 
there were no stragglers or skulkers or cowards there — nor 
was there any dramatic enthusiasm or excitement. This 
was the afternoon of the second day of baittle — our work and 
duty were plan and simple, and by every man they were well 
understood and well done. 

It is interesting now to read over the reports (in Vol. 51, 
O. R.) of the Confederate commanders who participated at 
Snodgrass, and so get the story from their point of view. 
Only a few paragraphs can be given here, but speaking gen- 



erally, those officers credit us with having repulsed their 
first, second, and some of them, a third assault, describe 
our firing as terrific and wholly unbearable, our intrench- 
ments (of which we had none whatever) as formidable, 
and our numbers are greatly exaggerated in their imagin- 
atioin. 

Hindman says (P. 305, O. R.) : "I hoped to secure the 
capture or destruction of the enemy by driving him in con- 
fusion upon the right wing of our army." He says also, 
after mentioning arrival of Preston's Division about 4:30: 
"From this time we gained ground, but though now com- 
manding nine brigades, with Kershaw co-operating, and all 
in action, I found the gain both slow and costly. The 
enemy fought with determined obstinacy and repeatedly re- 
pulsed us, but only to be again assaulted. I have never 
known Federal troops to fight as well ; it is just to say also 
that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better." 

Preston's Division lost after 4:30 o'clock, 1,336 in killed 
and wounded, and Preston says of Gracie, whose brigade 
made the last attack on Van Derveer (P. 416) : "This 
brigade carried into action 2,003 officers and men, and in 
the space of an hour lost 698 men killed and wounded. The 
Second Alabama Battalion, out of 237 lost 169 killed and 
wounded in the action — its color was pierced in 83 places." 

Capt. Toulmin, commanding the 22nd Alabama (P. 357), 
says: "Twice did it (the regiment) rally and attempt to re- 
cover its ground and lost colors (which had been literally 
riddled with bullets), but the storm of grape and canister 
was so terrific and destructive that every effort proved un- 
availing. Having fallen back a third time in some disorder, 
the regiment retired to the foot of the hill and re-formed 
there." 

Gen. D. H. Hill says in his Century Paper on Chick- 
amauga: "There was no more splendid fighting in '61, 

21 



when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, 
than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63 — 
but it seems to me the elan of the Southern soldier was 
never seen after Chiclcamauga — that brilHant dash which 
had distinguished him was gone forever," 

Chaplain Van Home, the official historian of the Army 
of the Cumberland, says of the Snodgrass Ridge contest 
(Vol. I, P. 350), that it, "for the vigor and frequency of 
charge and counter-charge, and successful resistance to 
vastly superior numbers, is perhaps without parallel in the 
war," 

Brannan says in his official report, of Van Derveer's 
Brigade: "This gallant brigade was one of the few who 
maintained their organization perfect through the hard 
fought passes of that portion of the field." 

The State of Minnesota has erected on the Chickamauga 
battle field, now a beautiful National Military Park, three 
monuments, to commemorate the services of its only regi- 
ment engaged in the battles there, one at Jay's Mill, one in 
Kelly's Field, and one where the colors of the regiment stood 
all that memorable Sunday afternoon on Snodgrass Ridge. 
The last one is conceded to be the finest and most appro- 
priate monument of the hundreds now there. It represents, 
by three bronze figures, the color guard in action, and bears 
the following inscription, duly verified as historically cor- 
rect, by the Park Commissioners and by the Secretary of 
War: 

"The Second Regiment, Minnesota Veteran Volunteer 
Infantry, occupied this position Sunday, September 20th, 
1863, from 2:30 p. m. to 7:30 p. m., successfully maintain- 
ing it against repeated assaults by the enemy, and with- 
drawing only after the attempt to take it had been aban- 
doned. 

"This regiment was engaged September 19th on the 

22 



Reed's Bridge road, and in the forenoon of September 20th 
at Kelly's Field ; in every contest repulsing the enemy oppos- 
ing it. Having 384 men engaged, its loss was 34 killed, 
114 * wounded, and 14 men (detailed for care of wounded) 
were captured; total loss, 42 per cent." 

"It is a notable fact that the Second Minnesota had not a 
single man among the missing or a straggler during the 
two days' engagement." (Quoting the) Official report of 
Col. Ferd'd Van Derveer, Commanding Brigade." 

Our march through the gap and thence to Rossville, was 
uninterrupted, and about 11 o'clock our brigade had lined 
up across the road, again facing the Confederacy, stacked 
arms, re-filled our cartridge boxes, and sent out a few 
pickets to the front. Then we laid ourselves down in the 
dusty grass and weeds along the line of stacks, glad to 
know that the battle was over, and that we were still alive 
and between the enemy and Chattanooga. 

At daybreak next morning a careful inspection and roll 
call verified the presence of every man of the Second Min- 
nesota Regiment, not killed, seriously wounded or captured. 

During the operations of the 20th our Second Minnesota 
Regiment lost 26 men killed and ^2) "^^"^ wounded. Of the 
wounded, 1 1 died on the field where they fell ; so that the 
figures then reported should riave been 37 killed and 62 
wounded. It will at once occur to old soldiers that when 
three men are killed out of every eight men hit, the fighting 
must have been desperate and at close quarters, which was 
the case at Kelly's Field, where most of the casualties oc- 
curred. At Snodgrass we ourselves did most of the killing 
and wounding, and while we had some casualties there, they 
cannot be stated separately. 

At Kelly's Field our Assistant Surgeon, Dr. Otis Ayer, 

* 1 1 mortally wounded. 

23 



the hospital steward and twelve men detailed to gather up 
and care for the wounded, were left there, to join us as soon 
as their work should be done. The enemy's skirmishers 
and stragglers soon swairmed over the field, however, and 
our men left there were captured — they were the only men 
not wounded that we lost from capture during the two 
days. So our total loss at Chickamauga foots up 45 killed, 
103 wounded, and 14 captured, in all 162, or 42 per cent of 
the 384 men engaged — 38^^ per cent of killed and wound- 
ed. (Our total Union loss — 11,413, K. & W.). 

Van Derveer's Brigade commenced the battle with 1,788 
men and lost 748, or 42 per cent killed and wounded, the 
heaviest loss in proportion to the men engaged, of any of 
the thirty-six brigades in the Union Army. As has been 
recited it had three separate engagements with the enemy, 
either of which considered apart from Chickamauga, would 
be regarded as a battle of some importance. In two of 
these — at Jay's Mill and at Kelly's Field — the brigade was 
isolated, receiving orders only from its own commander. 
It was, however, our good fortune that this brigade was not 
forced to, and did not, at any time yield any position in pres- 
ence of the enemy. Its gallant commander and three of its 
four regimental commanders, have passed to the Great Be- 
yond, as have also the division, corps and army commanders. 
Some of the veterans, however, still survive, and will meet 
next September to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Chick- 
amauga, and may they yet "live long and prosper." 



24 



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